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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION IN·CORPORATED, a corporation, and UINTAH BASIN
TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.
9010

vs.
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant. 1

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
It appears desirable that something of the history
of the Plaintiff Cooperatives, and those similarly situated
precede the presentation of the issues and proofs involved in the instant matter. There are eleven such cooperatives serving in the State of Utah; four of this number
are cooperative corporations domiciled in the States of
Idaho, ·Colorado and Wyoming, while the remaining seven
are non-profit corporations of the State of Utah. These
cooperatives are generally referred to as R E A Cooperatives, since they are financed by the Rural Electrification
Administration, an agency of the U. S. Department of
Agriculture. The Congress ·of the United States created
this agency in 1936, and the act set out the purpose of
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the Agency as an instrument designed to 'Fznance the
construction and oper-atvon of generating plants, electric
transmission .and d~stribut~on lines or systems for the
furnishzng of electric energy to persons in rural areas
who are not recet'ving central station service.'
Later the Act of 1936 was amended to include the
financing of telephonic service to these same rural areas,
where no such service was available. It should be pointed
out that private existing facilities would be given the ·
first opportunity to provide such telephonic service, and
upon their refusal, the R E A would, upon proper application, provide the requested financing. Three such
telephone cooperatives came into existence; one at
Orangeville, Emery County, one at Escalante in Garfield
County and one at Roosevelt, Utah. These three cooperatives are non-profit corporations of the State of Utah.
An applicant desiring to secure the services of REA
makes an application setting out the proposal it intends
to follow. This application is examined by R E A and
ultimately a plan is agreed upon between the applicant
and the engineering and planning division of R E A.
The management of the cooperative is vested in the
cooperative, subject to the approval of the Administrator
of this Federal Agency. Many management matters are
controlled by the managing body of the Cooperative.
Rates are fixed by the Cooperative subject to their approval by R E A. When the plans have been agreed upon
a Loan Contract is entered into between the Cooperative
and the United States of America. The Cooperative secures the Government for the money so advanced, with
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a first mortgage on all real and personal property owned
by it. As additional plant or equipment is needed, the
Loan Contract is amended to include these additions and
improvements. At no time can a cooperative borrow fror.o
any other institution or agency.
There are some seven to eight thousand members
being presently served by the various electric and telephone cooperatives in the State of Utah. (This will approximate some 25 to 30 thousand rural people.) A
consumer, patron or subscriber must be a member of the
cooperative before he or it can be served. Each member
is required to pay a reasonable membership fee. Each
member of a telephone cooperative is required to pay, in
addition to this membership fee, a payment of $45.00
which is termed an equity.
Since the people thus served fall within the lower income groups, the rate fixed is placed at a level that will
theoretically yield sufficient revenue to provide for debt
service, replacement and operating costs; due to competing rates of public utilities in adjacent areas, this level
of rates has not yet been achieved. Any appreciable raise
in rates will further depress and lessen the income per
mile of line, since the consumer is not disposed to pay
more for a service than a like service is costing in adjacent areas at or near the level of rates charged by power
and telephone companies serving in adjacent areas.
It is believed that this brief and general picture may
assist the Court in the determination of the issues involved in this matter.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs in this cause, and those similarly situated, have been, since their beginning, assessed and taxed
as is provided in the following Sections of the Utah Code
1953:

8 ection 16-6-16 U C A 1953:
"Property of cooperative nonprofit electric corporations organized under this chapter and operating facilities financed pursuant to the Rural
Electrification Act of 1936, shall not be valued for
the purpose of ad valorem taxation in excess of
$50.00 times the number of miles or primary distribution of transmission lines.''
Sect~on 16-6-17

U C A 1953, as amended:

"Property of cooperative nonprofit telephone
corporations organized under this chapter and financed pursuant to the United States Rural Electrification Act of 1936 as amended, shall not be
valued for the purpose of ad valorem taxation in
excess if $10.00 times the number of circuit miles
of line constituting the telephone system."
Sometime prior to July of 1958 the Chairman of the
State Tax Commission of the State of Utah Addressed
an inquiry to the Attorney General of the State of Utah,
asking these questions :
(1)

Is Section 16-6-16 U C A 1953, constitutionaB

(2)

Is Section 16-6-17 U C A 1953, constitutionaH

(3)

Should the property of the Moon Lake Electric
Association be assessed by the State Tax Commission, rather than by the County .Assessor?
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On July 2nd, 1958 the Attorney General sent to the
State Tax Commission an opinion wherein he held that
questions (1) and (2) should be answered in the negative,
while the third question was answered in the affirmative.
On September 3, 1958, the Attorney representing the
State Tax Commission advised the Plaintiffs in this
cause and all other electric and telephone cooperatives
doing business in the State of Utah to this effect:
"You are no doubt aware that on July 2nd, 1958, the
Attorney General of Utah advised this office that in his
opinion Sections 16-6-16 and 17, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, were unconstitutional.
This will advise you, therefore, that the State Tax
Commission intends to assess the property belonging to
Moon Lake Electric Ass'n., Inc., according to the same
formulas which are applied to other utilities operating
in more than one County in the State of Utah.
Very truly yours,
John Marshall, Attorney
Division of Law."
While we differ strenuously with the Attorney General on the question of the constitutionality of the two
sections of the ·Code, we do agree that the property of a
cooperative, or other utility, "when they are operated as
a unit in more than one County *** must be assessed by
the State Tax Commission ***"
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STATEMENT OF POIN·TS
POINT I
DO SEoCTIONS 16-6-16 AND 16-6-17 VIOLATE SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF ARTI1CLE XIII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 'THE STATE OF UTAH;
POINT II
DO THESE SAME SECTIONS OF THE CODE VIOLATE
SECTION 26 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION?

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT I
Section 2 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides in part: "All tangible property in
the State, not exempt under Laws of the United
States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as
provided by law*** (Emphasis added.)
"'The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation
on all tangible property in the state according
to its value in money***." (Emphasis added.)
In presenting the argument and authorities covering the two points raised, the plaintiff finds some difficulty in limiting its proof to the respective points. The
question of "assessment and taxation . . . according to
value in money" as required by Article 13 of the Constitution, and the further question raised by Section
26 of Article 6, Constitution of Utah, prohibiting "private or special laws affecting the assess1nent and collection of taxes and the granting to an individual association or corporation any privilege, imn1unity or fran-
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chise," are so inter-related and so interwoven, that it
is quite impossible to keep these two subjects distinct
and apart.
It is the plaintiff's contention that we must first
determine a method or formula for determining this
question of "value in money" then supply such forr11ula
as will enable the taxing authorities to arrive at a base
upon which the levy can be made. The only fonnula
or rule that can find general acceptance in the classi·fication of property. If this classification prescribed by
law is such that if the uniforn1 and equal rate of taxation
is applied, the property is then taxed in the same proportion to its value as is aU other tangible property, the
method of arriving at the assessed valuation is not
subject to constitutional objections.
It may be contended that classification must be
employed if we are to have uniformity as required
in Article 13 of our Constitution and it may well be
urged that such classification contravenes Section 26 of
Article 6, in that such classification becomes special or
private in its application.
The opinion of the Attorney General holding these
sections unconstitutional, concedes that legislation is
valid, and the enactments must be sustained unless in
violation of fundamental law.
This opinion holds that the language uaccording to
its value in money" means that all property shall be
valued, for the purpose of assessment, as near as is
reasonably practicable, at its full cash value; in other
words, that the valuation for assessment and taxation
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shall be as near as is reasonably practicable, equal to the
cash price fO'r which the property valued would sell in
open market) for thiJs is doubtless the correct test of
the value of property. (Emphasis added.)
In reaching the above conclusion the Attorney General refers to the case of ast~ate v. Thomas 7 16 U 86, 50 P.
615." There can be little dispute over the language of
the Court in this case, yet it leaves some doubt as to
how the State Tax Commission or a County Assessor
could use this formula or yardstick to enable it or him
to place a value upon any given property. The saleability
of property is inexorably tied to many factors. It can
hardly be contended that any taxing body could give
effect to the provisions of Section 2 and 3 of Article
XII, if their only instruction was to this effect: "You
will place a value upon property in an amount equal to
the price the property would sell for in the open market."
It must be admitted that the Legislature did provide
rules which it presumptively had a right to do, which
rules are set out in the Section 16-6-16 and 16-6-17.
There can be no doubt that in the assessment and taxation of property, the Constitution intended that all
taxable property shall bear its just proportion of the
burdens of taxation. With this end result there can
be no dispute. The practical problem of reaching this
end result is quite a different thing.
The Thomas case did define the language "according to its value in money" as applied to assessment and
taxation, to mean "Equal to the cash price for which
the property valued would sell in open market, for this
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is doubtless the correct test of the value of property.''
If we accept this definition as the measure of "value
in money", then we would be cmnpelled to make this
determination before we could fix an assessment and
levy a tax. If the various types and classifications of
taxable property had a recognized market value, the
problem would be reasonably simple. Actually, as a
practical matter, various type of property are not frequently bought and sold on this open market, hence fixing a market value on such property would be, at best,
a speculative thing. As Justice Cordozo said in W ~lliams
v. Mayor and Cvty Counci'l of B1altimore:
"Time with its tides brings new conditions
which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes
the new conditions affect the members of a class.
If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow
as the mischi,ef. The Constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them where there are special evils with
which the general laws are incompetent to
cope***" (Emphasis added)
Because of the complexities of this problem, the
legislature has in many instances provided a yardstick or formula which will enable the assessing and
taxing authorities to arrive at these market values.
This approach by the Legislature is done pursuant to
constitutional mandate. (Section 2 of Article XIII provides: "* * * shall be taxed in proportion to its value,
to be ascertained as provided by law." (Emphasis added), while Section 3 of the same Article 13 provides
"* * * acording to its value in money * * * to be ascertained as provided by law) * * *" (Emphasis added.)
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This ·Court in more recent cases has, we believe,
qualified the rule as announced in the Thomas case.
It must be kept in mind that the Constitution is
applicable to every conceivable kind of property, anywhere within the jurisdiction of the State. To contend
that the legislature must avoid a 1neans calculated to
give efect to the language of the Constitution by generalizing as to value, is a contention that can find little
warrant in legal terminology or the practicality of any
given situation. Land is assessed on the basis of its area;
livestock on a per head basis; mines are usually assessed
on its area together with some formula calculated to
arrive at its worth. These illustration could be multiplied without end. This thing value is a relative term,
affected and influenced by use, location, earning power
and a variety of factors too numerous to mention. There
must be classifiJcati•on of property if there iJs to be compliance wiJth these ConstiJtutional provisions. (Emphasis
added.)
In the case entitled State ex rel Public Service Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., reported in 79 Pac. 2nd
at page 25 (A Utah case) the Court had this to say:
"The fair value as a rate base and the value
in money for purposes of taxation of a public
utility are not necessarily the same," and the
Court goes on to say: "For the purposes of taxation of a publvc utility, where it is the present
value of property in nwney that is to be determi"YYed, the present, past, and prospective future
capacity to earn and the market value of sto~ks
and bonds of the utility for a reasonable peno,d
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antecedent to the making of the assessment constitutes the most rel~able influential evidence of
value."
The Court in the instant case makes these
further observations concerning the question of
value: "The elements to be cons~dered fo·r determiming value of .a publiJc ut~lity' s property for
purposes of taxation are original or historical
cost, cost of reproduction, less depreciation, conditions of competition in the imdustry, effVci·ency
or lack of i·t in man.agement, bonded tnde:bted!Jfess,
current market val~te of stocks .and bonds, actual
present earn~ngs and earnings over a period of
years." (Emphasis added)
This Court has on frequent occasions considered
this matter of value in its tax application. One of its
most recent decisions is that contained in the case entitled "UniJted States Smelt~ng Refining & Mining Co.,
v. H,aynes, County Treasurer." reported in 176 P. 2nd.
at page 622. Although the factual situation differs, yet
the Court had occasion to consider the same constitutional matters as are here involved. The Haynes case
involved the construction of a statute relative to determining the base or valuation of metalliferous mines
for tax purposes. The Appellant contended in the Haynes
case that to include premium payments in "proceeds
realized" for the purpose of determining the valuation
of the mine for assessment purposes, would violate the
constitutional requirements as to uniformity of assessments and taxation as required by Sections 2, 3 and 4
of Article XIII, Constitution of Utah, and Section 8
of Article I, and Section I of 14th. Amendment to the
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Constitution of the United States. In considering this
contention of the Appellant, the Court had this to say:
"It will be observed that these provisions
(Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article 13 of the Constitution of the State of Utah) require that all tangible property, including metalliferous mines,
shall be subjected to a uniform and equal rate
of assessment according to its value in money.
The method or yardstick by which the valwation
.in money is to be determined shall be prescribed
by the Legislature. It is not required that the
same yardstick or method of determining value
shall be used with respect to .all k~nds of property. But the different formulae which may be
applied to different kinds of prope.rty must be
such that they aim and tend to secure for assessment purposes OJ valuation fair and equiJtable in
comparison w~th and commensurate with the
valuaNon of other kinds of property. When the
valuatiion thus secured is such that if the uniform and equal rate of taxation is applied the
property is t.axed in the came proportion to its
value as is all other tangible property, the method of arriving at the assessed valuation is not
subject to constitutiJonal objections as violative
of Artvcle XIII." (Emphasis added)
It is conceded that the statutory method of valuing
metalliferous mines for taxation purposes at $5 per
acre plus a multiple or sub-multiple of the net proceed'3
is a proper and constitutional forn1ula for determining
the value of the 1nines for assessment purposes. See
South Utah Mines .and Smelters 'V. Beaver County, 262
U.S. 325, 43 S. Ct. 577, 67 L. Ed. 1004; JIIercur Gold
M~n~ng & Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 lT. 222 52 P. 382; Salt
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Lake County v. Utah Copper Co. 10 cir., 294 F. 199;
Tintic St.andard Jl,fining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah
491, 15 P. 2nd. 633; Byrne v. Fulton Ovl Co., 85 Mont.
329, 278 P. 314.
But it is argued that to include premium payments
in the gross proceeds of mines violates the rule because:
(a) it amounts to classification of mines into different
groups for taxation purposes. (b) in determining the
value of the mine in 1944, it takes into consideration
the production of the mine 1941 as well as the proceeds
in 1943. (c) The value of the mine would be based inversely upon the production quotas fixed by the Government instead of upon the net proceeds. (d) It amounts
to fixing values upon gross costs rather than upon net
proceeds. The argument to sustain these points are rather abstruse and tenuous. Instead of anlyzing and answering each argument, we shall consider the basic question
and therein dispose of all points raised.
The Court then goes on to consider the question of
whether the inclusion of premium payment infringes the
uniformity clause of the Constitution. The Court has
this to say:
"Use of proceeds as a basis for determining
valuation for taxation purposes has been used
not only for mines but railroads, motor carriers,
and other public utilities. The uniformity clause,
when applied to formulae based on proceeds, does
not require that all individuals or companies within the class to which the formula is applied have
the same income or the same source of obtaining
their proceeds but merely that the rule for com-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
putation of proceeds apply alike, uniformly, to
all within the class to which the proceeds formula applies."
The Court in the Haynes case quotes with approval
the case of Bt.ate v. Great Northern R. Co., 174 Minn. 3,
218 N.W. 167, 169, in which case a railroad complained
because of its assessrn_ent based on gross earnings; the
railroad had enjoyed a windfall because of certain ore
contracts. The law was assailed on the ground that it
Inight result in a highe::.· tax on one railroad than on
another although the cost of building and replacing the
roadbed of each would be the same. The Court said:
"The taxing authorities must take gross earnings as they
find them. They do not fix earnings * * * Large earnings give value, and the road has a unitary value which
cannot be disregarded * * * such earnings give the
defendant's property great value which reflects itself
in taxes."
In the case entitled: Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v
Jttnod, 71 Mont. 132, 227 P. 1001, which case involved
again the computation of net proceeds, and the Appellant complained that to apply the rule would violate
the application of the unifor1nity of assessment clause
of the Constitution. The Court in answer to this claim
had this to say: "The Constitutional requirements of
uniformity and equality were not violated because some
mines had bigger incon1es or sn1aller expenses on the
same mining operations."
It is not difficult to find a Inultitude of cases wherein this question of value, has received the close and
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scrutinizing attention of many Courts, both State and
Federal. As the tax burden ever increases in local,
County, State and Federal spheres, it is fair to assume
that this matter of value will ever grow more provocative. It is difficult to conceive of an expression more
difficult to define, one more widely misunderstood, than
the value of any article, or service. Rates based on
value, taxation linked to value, these and the many
other facets of the word, has yet to find common acceptance. The unquenchable hunger for more taxes, and
the diminishing types of property, which can be reached
for revenue, combine to make this problem one of concern to the people who pay, and the unit of government
bent on spending. How far beyond its present level
this tax and spend orgy can go, poses a problem that
confounds he who makes even a casual inquiry into its
effect. It is not the purpose of the authors of this presentation to avoid its just share of this common burden. It is our earnest contention that "value" or its
"value in money" as used in the Constitution can and
is best arrived at by the formula or method set out
in Sections 16-6-16 and 16-6-17 DCA 1953.
In Parson v. Detroit & Canada Tunnel Co., 15 F.
Supp 986 (1936) and affirmed 92 F. (2nd.) 893 ( 1937),
the taxpayer operated a tunnel between Detroit and
Windswor, Canada. Its property was required to be
taxed at its true cash value. The total cost of the property was over $3,600,000. Its replacement cost was approximately $2,500,000. During 1932, 1933 and 1934, the
property was annually assessed at over $3,500,000. A
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fair capitalization of earnings showed a valuation of
approximately $850,000. The Court found that the tunnel
company had operated efficiently and economically, and
that all reasonable efforts had been made to increase
its income and reduce its expenses.
The District Court, in rejecting the assessment
based solely on original cost less depreciation, said
(page 997):
"It is well established principle of law in
arriving at the true cash value, within the provisions of the Michigan Laws and other similar
statutes of a single purpose, public utility property, such as here involved, whose only value is
derived from its capacity to earn money by its
use for a definite single purpose, the so-called
o.apiJtalizatiJon of net income method sometimes
calle:d the net earntng methods, should be given
.a primary and paramount weight either as the
sole method of valuations or used in combination
with the stock and bond valuation method, socalled, whe-re as in the present case, it appears
that the property has received economical and
prudent management and that such method shows
a valuation substantially less than the depreciated
cost of such property, as to render an assessment
based on such cost clearly and grossly excessive
and arbitr.ary." (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court accordingly reduced the assessment from
$3,600,000.00 to $848,000 for each of the ~-ears in question, basing the new assessment solely on the earning
power of the property.
The Circuit Court of apeals for the 6th Circuit
Court affirmed the above decision of the District Court.
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In its op1n10n, reported in 92 F ( 2d) 833 at page 836,
the Court said :
"It is clear that if the assessments made by
the taxing authorities were so grossly excessive
as to be unreasonable, and were arrived at by
the adoption of fundamentally wrong principles,
they were not final and a Federal Court of Equity
has power to grant relief because taxation based
upon such valuations deprives the company of its
property and denies it the equal protection of
the law * * *" "The assessors and reviewing
boards del~berately refused to take tnto consiJderation the earnings or e~arniJng power of the tunnel property as factors in determining its cash
value for taxation purposes, Thus the most fundamental element tn value w.as set at naught * * *
(p. 837), There is JJJ) evidence that the taxing
authorities were guilty of any actual fraud, but
we think _that, in persistently adhering to cost
less depreciation as a formula for arriving at
'true cash value' and in ignoring the capitalized
income method adopted by both the master and
the Court, they proceeded upon a fundamentally
wrong basis." (Underscoring supplied.)

In People ex. rel. Lehigh Vtalley Ry Co. v. Harris,
168 Misc. 685, 6 NY.S. (2d) 794 (1938) affirmed by the
New York ·Court of Appeals 281 N.Y. 786, 24 N. B. (2d)
476 (1939) The Court said:
"The Empire State Building is a valuable
property, not only because of the large sum of
money expended in its construction, but on account of its location in the business center of
New York City, where the demand for stores and
offices is great. In arriving at its value for assessment purposes its reconstruction cost would be
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an important item in deterrnining that amount.
But would anyone be bold as to suggest that, if
the building were to be taken out of its environment and placed in the center of the Adirondack
Mountains, remote from business activity, and
where few, if any tenants were to be found to
occupy the offices and stores, and the revenue
to be derived from rentals would be practically
nothing, the construction cost would then be decisive of the value of the building~ Would a rai·lroad three hundred miles long, connecUng two
important industrial centers, and running through
a prosperous and thickly inhabt"'ied country, be
as valuable as one of the s.ame length built in the
w~lds where but few people resiJded, and where
there was no industrial or business activity? Yet
the reconstruction cost of the two ro:ads would be
substant~ally the same. To ask these questions is
but to answer them * * *" (Underscoring supplied.)
The case ofState v. Illinois C. R. Co., 27 ill. 64, in
volved the taxation of the property of a railroad company under a constitutional provision that "every person and corporation shall pay a ta..c~ in proportion to the
value of his or her property."
In holding that the present earning capacity of such
property is of prime in1portant in determining value
for taxation, the Court said:

"Where property has a known and determinate value ascertained by commerce in vt, as
in most kinds of personal property, or f.ixed by
law, as money, there can be no difficulty. But
there are so many kinds of property as to which
the assessor has no such satisfactory guVde. Such
is peculia·rly the case with riailro'ad property
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and other similar property. In such oases, the inquiry should be, What vs the property worth to
be used for the purpose for whvch it is constructed, ,and not for any other purpose to whiJch
it might be applied or converted, or for which
it mvght be used. In such cases, if the property
is devo·ted to the use for whvch U was designed
and is in a condition to produce its maximum
tncome, one very innporbant element for ascertaining its present value is discovered and that
is net profits." (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Hall~day, 61 Ohio St. 352, 56 N. B. 118
(1899), the Court said,
" ... That the income-producing oapacity of an
.artvcle is ,an important factor in determining vts
value is so obvious as to seem beyond the bounds
of controversy. This doctrine was sanctioned in
its application to real estate in State v. Jones, 51
Ohio St. 513, 37 N. E. 945, and in Express Co. v.
Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 220, 17 Sup. Ct. 504
41 L. Ed. 965, and no reason .is perce1med, nor h.as
·any been assigned, why a prt"nciple so plain and
just should not be applved universally to all specves
of property. This is the first inquiry that .a prudent Prospective purchaser would make . .. " (Italics added.)
Floyd v. M anufactur'ers' Light & Heat Comp.any,
111 Ohio St. 57 144 N. E. 703 (1924)
"The true value in money of any property is affected by the same considerations throughout as
would render the property desir,able as an imvestment. (Italics added.)
People ex rel. Walki:ZZ Valley R. Co. v. Keater, 36
Hun. 592; affirmed 101 N. Y. 610 3 N. E. 903
(1885).
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It would seem unwise to burden this brief with extensive quotations from the authorities. The problem has
arisen in most states under statutes having a similar
meaning and calling for assessment at "fair value'' or
"True value" or "Cash value" or the equivalent of these
phrases. The courts have held uniformly that earning
power is the most important and accurate index of valu~
in the tax assessment of property of this kind. Without
attempting an exhaustive citation, the following cases are
typical:

Trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Ry. v. Guenteher, 19 F. 395 (1884)
Railroad & Tele:ph. Cos. v. Bd. of Eqwalizers, 85
Fed. 302 (1897)
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Eveland, 13 F. (2d)
442 (19·26)
Stein v. Mobile, 17 Ala. 234 (1850).
Harvey Bldg. Corp. v. Bannon, 191 So. 784 (Fla.
1939).
Cleaveland C. C. and St. L. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind.
513, 33 N E. 421 (1894) aff'd 154 U.S. 439,38
L. Ed. 1041 (1894).
State ex rel. Bee Bldg. Co. v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714,
91 N. W. 716 (1902)
Western Union Telegriaph Co. v. Dodge County,
80 Neb. 18, 113 N. W. 805 (1907) aff'd 80 Neb.
23, 117 N. W. 468 (1908).
State v. Virg~n~a & T. R. Co., 24 Neb. 53, 49 Pac.
945 (1897)
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State v. Nevada Cent. R. Co., 28 Nev. 186, 81 Pac.
99 (1905)
People ex. rel. Ogdensburg & L. C. R. Co. vs. Pond.
13 Abb. N. C. 1 (N.Y. 1882.)
People ex. rel. Fitchburg R. Co., v. Raren, 50 Hun.
605, 3 N.Y. Supp. 86 (1888)
People ex. rel. Powers v. Kalbfleisch, 25 App. Div.
432 49 N. Y. Supp. 546 (1898) appeal dismissed 156 N. Y. 678, 50 N. E. 1121 (1898)
People ex. rel. Buffalo & S. L. R. Co. v. Fredericks, 48 Barb. 173 (N.Y. 1860) aff'd 48 N.Y.
70 (1871)
People ex. rel. Dela & H. Canal Co. v. K eetor 2
How. Prac. (N.S.) 479 (N. Y. 1885)
People ex. rel. Dela & H. Canal Co. v. Roose 2
How. Prac. (N. S.) 454 (N. Y. 1885)
LouiseviJlle & N. R. Co. v. State, 55 Tenn. 663
(1875)
Franklin County v. N.ashvvlle C. & St. L. R. Co.
80 Tenn.
State v. Pullman Co., 178 Wise. 240, 189 N. W. 548
(1922)
Summarizing the rules of law laid down by these
cases, the following statements of the courts are exactly
applicable to the valuation of the property of rural
electric cooperatives :
It is a cardinal rule which should never be forgotten
that whatever property is worth for the purposes of income and sale it is also worth for purposes of taxation.
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':rhe income-producing capacity of an article is an
important factor in determining its value and this is the
first inquiry that prudent prospective purchaser would
make.
Particularly pertinent to a rural electric system is
the above-quoted New York Case of People v. Harris 6
N.Y. S. (2d)794, in which the ·Court stated as self-evident
that a railroad line of equal length .and cost in more
sparsely settled rural areas could nO't possibly be as valuable .as a railroad line in 1nore prosperous are.as. Similarly, the original cost of the rural electric line or its replacement cost has little or no significance with reference
to value for tax purposes. An electric distribution line in
prosperous, thickly settled areas might have net earnings
of $10,000 a year; but would a similar line constructed
at exactly the same cost but operating in a sparsely settled, less profitable area, have the same value for purposes of tax assessment~ As stated by the New York
Court, merely to ask this question is to answer it. A
prudent investor would pay many times as much for the
more profitable property, exercising his common sense
business judgment that it would be many times more
profitable and correspondingly more valuable. Valuation
for tax purposes must be regarded as the same in value
"for purposes of income and sale."
In most states, the taxing authorities have assessed
the property of rural electric cooperatives at sums much
less than $100 per mile. In a great majority of states, the
assessments have been considerably less than this figure
for the early development years before earning power
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has been established. There is nothing peculiar in tax
assessments that are below the book value of the property. Whatever may be the justification of this practice
with respect to highly profitable enterprises that have
reached full earning power, it is abundantly clear, under
court decisions of every state, that valuation based upon
earning power is peculiarly appropriate to the enterprises here under discussion. This is not because they are
cooperatives but because of the kind of territory in which
they operate. A stock corporation organized for profit
and operating in similar territory, should of course be
assessed on the same basis and with the same results. It
is a fundamental theory of all kinds of taxation that taxes
should be adjusted according to the ability to pay. This
is true of ad valorem assessments of business property
of this kind since the value of the property is in direct
ratio to net earnings. Excessive taxation, beyond ability
to pay, will jeopardize the successful development of
these new enterprises. If they are not unduly burdened
by operating costs in their early and development years
they will contribute increasingly, both directly and indirectly, to the taxable wealth of the community.
From a practical standpoint, assessment at actual
value based upon earning power (even though less than
$100 a mile has been the practice in most states) has not
been prejudicial to the administration of local government. These properties, at any rate, constitute new wealth
which was not existent when current tax rates were established. They do not add to the cost of government as
is true of many kinds of new property which increase
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the need for greater expenditures for education, roads,
etc. In many indirect ways they add to the wealth and
prosperity of the rural communities which they serve. In
calling attention to these facts we do not imply that they
are entitled to favored treatment by tax officials unless
such encouragement is authorized by the legislature.
vVha t we do mean is that there is every reason, both in
law and in practical tax administration for tax assessments at their true value based upon earning power and
upon present ability to pay.
POINT II.
Are Section 16-6-16 and 16-6-17 U C A 1953
unconstitutional as violative of Section 26 of Article 6 of the Constitution of Utah, which prohibits
special laws affecting: (1) assessing and collecting taxes, and ( 2) granting to an individual, association or corporation any privilege, immunity
or franchise.
The Attorney General in his July 2nd opinion, and
the Defendant in its Answer, complain that the two Sections of the Code contravene Artcile 6 of the Constitution,
since the Code Sections are limited in their application
and result in "identification" rather than a legitimate
classification.
ARGUMENT
'The plaintiff contends that the following authorities
plainly indicate that this position of the Defendant is
not tenable. May we call to the attention of this Court an
Indiana case entitled: TAX COMMISSION v. J.A·CKSON 283 U.S. Reports 527 (Indiana case):
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In this case the State of Indiana required that a
business must before it could operate, secure a license.
The license fee was a graduated one; a single owned store
was permitted to secure such a license by the payment of
a fee much less than a store belonging to a chain. The
chain contended that the classification was arbitrary and
unconstitutional. It was contended by the chains that
there was no difference between the operation of a singly
owned store and one of a chain. The trial court held that
"all persons engaged in the operation of one or more
stores *** belong to the same class, for occupational tax
purposes*** and should pay the same license fee, regardless of the number of stores owned and operated by
them." And that any other other classification is arbitrary and unconstitutional.
The U. S. Supreme Court on· appeal said: "The
power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence
of the government of the States. The restriction that it
shall not be so exercised as to deny to any the equal protection of the laws, does not compel the adoption of an
iron rule of equal taxation, nor prevent variety or differences in taxation of properties, nuisances, trades, callings
or occupations. (Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Penn. 134 U. S.
Reports 232; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas 217 U. S.
Reports 114; Brown-Foreman Co. v. Kentucky 217 U. S.
Reports 563.)
The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of a
certain class does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction. See: American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana 179 U. S. 89; or
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if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it. (Rast v. ·van Dernan 240 U. S. Reports 342.)
This Court in the case of GARRETT FREIGHT
LINES v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al, a Utah
case decided in 1943, and reported in 135 P. 2nd. at page
523, said this:
"·Collateral purposes or motives of a legislature in
levying a tax of a kind within the reach of its lawful
power are matters beyond the scope of judicial inquiry
*** nor may a tax within the lawful power of a state be
judicially stricken down under the due process clause
simply because its enforcement may or will result in restricting or even destroying particul~r occupations or
businesses ***"
This Court then quoted with approval the case of
NICOL v. AMES 173 U. S. 509 and KNOWLTON v.
~100RE 178 U. S. at page 41. In the Nicol case the Supreme Court made this observation: "Taxation is eminently practical, and is in fact brought to every man's
door; and for the purpose of deciding upon its validity,
a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results
rather than with reference to those theoretical or abstract
ideas whose correctness is the subject of dispute and
contradiction among those who are experts in the science
of political econon1y."
This Court in the the Garret case then goes on: "The
abilvty to bear the burden is everywhere recognized as
reasonable grO'und upon whvch to baBe a classification in
ta:r measures." In conclusion we reiterate a statement
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heretofore made by this Court: "It i's too well settled to
requ.ire more than passtng mention that State Constitutions are mere limitat~ons ~and not grants of power. It is
equally settled that the power of vaxation is a legislattve
function, and unless restrained by the Constitution, the
exercise of this power i~s vested in the leyiJslature and its
power over the subject i's plenary and supreme.'' (See
Salt Lake ·City v. Christensen Go., 34 U. 38: 95P. 523.)
I believe it is a fair conclusion that the rule adopted
in the case of BROWN-FORMAN CO. v. KEN'TUCKY,
Reported in 217 U. S. at page 342, fairly states the attitude of both State and Federal Courts with reference to
this matter of classification; the U S. Supreme Court in
the Brown-Forman case concluded: "A very wide discret~on must be conceded to the legislative: power of the St,ate
in the classifi;cation of trades, callings, businesses or occupations which may be subjected to spedal forms of
regulation or taxation through an exdse or license tax.
If the selection or classiji)cation is neither caprvcious nor
arb~trary, rand rests upon some re1asonable consideration
of difference or poliJcy, there; iJs no deniJal of the equal protection of the law."
Rural electric cooperatives ask no special tax status
unless such is conferred by proper legislation as has been
done in certain states. They ask only that they be assessed according to sound principles, guaranteed by federal and state constitutions and established by decisions
of the courts. It is thoroughly established as a fundamental principle of sound taxation that earning power is the
most important criterion of value with respect to business
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properties of this kind. As stated by the United States
Supreme Court in Adams Express Co. vs. Ohio State
Auditor 166 U S. 18'5 41 L. ed. 965, 977 (1897),
"Now, it is a cardinal rule which should never be
forgotten that whatever property is worth for the
purposes of income and sale, it is also worth for
purposes of taxatvon"
The courts have said, over and over again, that such
property is worth only what a prudent investor would
pay for it. What is it that a prudent investor does in
reaching his estimate of the value of a property~ He considers earning power-sometimes as his sole criterion of
value, always as his most important criterion. He is not
primarily interested in the construction cost or the replacement cost. It is largely immaterial to him that the
construction cost - let us say - was $100,000. If the
property has no earning power, or very little earning
power, he would be willing to pay only a small fraction
of that amount. To arrive at the value of the property~
the prudent investor ascertains its net earning power. In
arriving at net earnings he necessarily includes a fair
deprciation charge as an iten1 of expense. This is in
accord with elementary principles of sound business accounting. There can be no continuing gross income let alone, net incmne - unless proper replacements are
made as the property wears out. A reserve for such replacements must necessarily be set up as a charge against
gross earnings. After arriving at the annual net earnings
which the property is able to yield, he capitalizes such
amount at the rate of return which prudent investment
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requires for the property in question. If it is a business
of little risk with established and stable earning power, a
proper rate of capitalization might be five or six per
cent. For a new business or one with uncertain future
earning power a proper rate might well be ten per cent.
There is nothing new in this method of arriving at
the value of business properties for purposes of tax
assessment. It is a principle that has been long established in tax administration and has been insisted upon
by the courts. The only problem that is new is the factual
situation to which this old principle must be applied.
The new and special fact situation is this. These
properties of rural electric cooperatives would not and
could not have come into being by the usual investment
of capital seeking a profit. They have been financed by
the United States Government through the Rural Electrification Adminstration because of the great public
problem that is inherent in rural electrification. ·They
represent an unprecendented investment in a type of
electric power and light properties that has extremely
low earning power. They are constructed in sparsely
settled rural areas where private capital has been unwilling or unable to go. They ask no favored treatment; they
recognize that they should be taxed according to established principles of valuation; but they claim that the
proper application of these principles leads to far different results (at least in their early years of development)
than would be true with respect to properties of greater
earning power.
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The purposes which have led to the creation of this
new wealth are highly relevant to the question of valuation for tax purposes. These rural electric lines are of
incalculable value to the communities they serve; but for
tax purpose they should be valued according to ability to
pay. Any other theory of tax assessment not only is unsound as a matter of law, but might make it impossible
for these new enterprises to prosper and render adequate
service to the life and wealth of the communities they
serve. Agriculture contfuues to be one of the cornerstones
of our civilization. But the widening gap between rural
and urban standards of life and work has become a problem of major public concern in almost every state. It is
an accepted fact that electricity is no longer a luxury but
is a common convenience and necessity in the American
economy of business and in home life. The farm is a place
of business as well as a horne, and under present day
conditions a farmer has special need for electric power.
The farmer needs electricity in his home to maintain a
basic standard of living. He needs it in his business in
order to improve production methods and decrease the
costs of production. Increased industrial and farm activity increases the need for electricity on the farm and in
unserved small towns to enable the farmer and the worker
in rural industry better to serve the nation. Widespread
rural electrification is long over-due in the United States.
Fifteen years ago only one Nebraska farn1 in fifteen had
electric service. Today, in spite of the long strides that
have been 1nade toward the solution of the public prob-
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lem of bringing electric service to the farms of N ehraska,
almost half of them are still without service.
It is for these reasons that it is appropriate in this
important field of rural electrification for the government to take financial risks which private capital is
unable to assume. The result is a new type of electric
enterprise-one in which there is an unprecedented disparity between capital investment and earning power.
Considering the enormity of the public problem as well
as the prospects for repayment, the investment is justified. The Government confidently expects that its REA
loans will be repaid. But this expectation is based upon a
look ahead- 25 to 35 years- and upon a maintenance
of farm income at a decent American standard, to which
electricity will greatly contribute. ~There is not the slightest inconsistency between this. belief . in the economic
feasibility of rural electrification and our contention that
earning power is the only proper criterion for valuation
for tax purposes. If rural electric cooperatives had the
earning power which is normally required by private
capital in the business world, there would he a close and
normal correlation between construction cost and a value
based upon a capitalization or earnings. The fact is,
however, that they probably will never have such earning
power and certainly they do not have it in their early
and development years. Considering the nature of the
territory in which they operate--territory which private
capital is unwilling to venture toward- they probably

will never do more than break even in their profit and
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loss account, after paying interest and making the proper
charges for depreciation.
This lack of net earning power is not due to abnormally low rates or inefficient management. Rates are
closely comparable to those charged by utility companies
in rural areas. Higher rates ·would prevent the extensive
use of electricity for power which is possible on the farm
and reduce the upward trend of net revenues. The operating expenses of these cooperative associations are at a
low level that is unprecedented in the light and power
industry. It is apparent therefore that present earnings
of these electric cooperatives., as shown by their profit
and loss statements, are an accurate index of earning
power. Since earning power is the only proper criterion
of value for tax purposes, the inquiry of taxing officials
should be addressed to such net earnings rather than to
construction cost. Before analyzing the tax status of
typical electric cooperatives in the light of sound and
lawful principles of valuation, it might be helpful to cite
a number of leading court decisions which have established such principles.
We find some difficulty in discovering the reasons
whcih prompted the Attorney General in reaching his
conclusions. Nothing therein is revealed why the statutory method he attacks would not result in these cooperatives paying a tax in proportion to the value of its property. Although the Attorney General and counsel for the
appellants herein 1nay differ as to what constitutes
proper cirteria for determining value, yet this alone
would not enable this Court to reach a proper conclusion.
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In order that the Court may have some factual information concerning these cooperatives, there is hereinafter
set out the profit and loss statement of 3 of such cooperatives. There is also attached a statement of total
number of miles of line of five of these electric cooperatives, the number of members so served, and the revenue
per mile of line. There is added to this data a statement
showing the average revenue per mile of all electric cooperatives in the State of Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Idaho
and Wyoming.
May we point out the financial operation of at least
three of these Utah Cooperatives, namely (1) Garkane
Power Association, serving the rural areas of Sevier,
Wayne, Piute, Garfield and Kane Counties in the State
of Utah; (2) Uintah Basin Telephone Association, Inc.,
serving the rural areas of Duchesne and Uintah Counties
in the State of Utah and (3) The South Central Utah
Telephone Association, serving the rural areas of Sevier,
Piute, Garfield, Kane and Iron Counties in the State of
Utah.
It is equally interesting to note that in five of the
eleven cooperatives serving the rural population of the
State of Utah, the total number of miles of line is 1964,
while the total number of consumers served is 5423, resulting in an average of 2.76 customers or consumers per
mile of line.
Considering the 949 active cooperative borrowers in
operation in the U. S. for the year 1957, the median
aveage miles for each cooperative in 1283, while the median average customers is 3640. This gives a national aver-
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age in these 949 cooperatives of 2.84 consumer per mile
of line. There follows a tabulation of 4 of such cooperatives in Utah, 3 in Vermont, 10 in Virginia, 9 in Idaho
and 10 in Wyoming, showing the revenue per mile of line
in each of these cooperatives in each of these five states.
It will be noted that the average revenue per mile in
Utah iss $33.26-in Vermont the average revenue per
mile iss $28.94, while the average in Virginia is $29.20,
in Idaho $27.20 and in Wyoming $34.40.
Exhibit "A", "B", "·C" and "D'
EXHIBIT "A"
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION
NET OPERATING MARGINS- PROFIT OR LOSS
Current Year
12/31/48
" I " I 49
"I" /50
"I" /51
"I" /52
"I" /53
"I" /54
"I" /55
"I" /56
"I "/57
"I" /58

-------·············-·······-···---·------·-----$ 9,199.40

·-----·-······-·····--········-·················
···············-····-------·------··---··-······
................................................
··················-···-··-···----····---·-··-------··-·-----------·----·-----··--------··-----············----·--·········--·······---·------·
................................................
·····················-·····----·--···········-·................................................
········----·---····---·······-······-··········

35,360.95
472.24
14,736.89
27,611.35
16,284.86
4,620.79
4,101.98
8,781.13
13,499.79
13,577.51

Previous Year
$ 83,379.99
118,740.94
118,269.70
133,006.59
160,617.94
176,902.80
172,282.01
176,383.99
167,602.86
154,103.07
140,525.56

EXHIBIT "B"
UINTAH BASIN TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, INC.
INCOME STATEMENT
Year Ending December 31, 1957
Operating Revenues:
Local Service Revenue ·············-·········-·--···-·
Toll Service Revenues ............................... .
Miscellaneous Operating Revenues ......... .
Gross Revenues ................................... .
Less: Uncollectible operating revenue..... .
Total Operating· Rev~nues ................... .
Operating revenue deductions:
Maintenance labor ........................................$ 6,684.96
Maintenance Materials & Supplies............ 2,255.85
Other maintenance expenses .................... 4,602.91

$42,823.76
15,763.69
4,706.53
$63,293.98
540.66
$62,753.32
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Other traffic expense -------------------------------Salaries ---------------------------------------------------------Other operating expenses:
Adv. -------------------------------------------------------Directors Fees and expense _______________ _
Directory Expense -----------------------------Area Survey -----------------------------------------Insurance ---------------------------------------------Legal -----------------------------------------------------Office Supplies & expense ---------------General expense ---------------------------------Audit -----------------------------------------------------Postage -------------------------------------------------Rent for general office -----------------------Stationery & printing -----------------------Travel and incidental --------------------------

1,317.51
6,017.25
31.01
1,165.95
1,246.54
161.32
1,058.51
178.85
383.74
940.44
952.32
369.11
600.00
1,106.23
1,215.58

Depreciation -------------------------------------------------- 18,648.59
699.95
Amortization of plant adjustments ........... .
Operating taxes -------------------------------------------- 5,404.83
Rental for lease of telephone plant___________ _ 2,499.45
General service and license ------------------------ 1,722.06
56.20
Miscellaneous taxes -----------------------------------$60,156.62
Net operating income -----------------------Other income:
Miscellaneous physical property........
Rental of poles & central office........

2,596.70
106.50
1,233.59

Interest on long term debt --------------------

1,340.09
3,936.79
9,404.46

Net (Loss) -----------------------------------------------------------( $5,467.67)
Less $56.80 tax J IE entry
EXHIBIT "D"
Gaskane 1957 (Utah 6)
Miles of line-608
No. of consumers-2,042
Operating loss-$140,525.56 (1949 to 1958 incl.)
Revenue per mile-29.04 in 1957
Moon Lake 1957 (Utah 8)
Miles of line--1,113
No. of consumers-2,907
Operating loss-$19,787.00
Revenue per mile--$61.75
Escalante Valley (Utah 10)
Miles of line--110
No. of consumers-259
Revenue per mile-$18.50
Howell Elec. (Utah 11)
Miles of line--98
No. of consumers-162
Revenue per mile--$23. 74
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Dixie Rural (Utah 14 K)
No. of miles-35
No. of consumers-53
Average Revenue per mile of 4 in. Utah, 3 in. Vermont, 10 in.
Virginia, 9 in. Idaho, 10 in. Wyoming is:
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Idaho
Wyo.
29.04
32.52
26.49
32.80
26.81
61.75
28.55
37.15
24.80
29.57
18.50
25.74
32.21
36.38
33.21
23.74
28.07
22.60
32.53
27.80
19.08
19.58
78.85
25.19
49.46
31.99
45.43
28.89
31.16
9.50
33.78
28.49
29.06
22.20
19.83
67.93
Utah -------------········-----$33.26 - 4 Idaho -------------------------- 27.20 - 9
Vermont -------------------- 28.94 - 3 Wyo. -------------------------- 34.396-10
Virginia --------·--·-------- 29.20 -10
Average number of consumers served nationally, 1957
Residential service. Farm and non-farm --------------------------------------- 91.4%
Commercial & industrial --······-·--------··----------------------------------------------·- 7. 7%
Other electric service .......................................................................... 0.9%
Kilowatt-hour Sales:
Residential service-farm & non-farm ········--····-·-··························· 71.3%
Commercial & industrial .................................................................... 23.0%
Other electric service ·················------·································-·--················ 4.1%
To others for re-sale ·················-······-----················---··-·····--------------······ 1.6%
Revenues:
Residential service - Farm & non-farm ···········-······--·--·------·--·-······ 77.4%
Commercial & industrial ·-·······--······---·-·········--·--·--·----------·········-········ 17.6%
Other electric service ····------------······----------·····---······--------------····-········· 3.0%
To others for re-sale --·-·-··-------------------------------------------···-···------·-------···- 0.6%
The average monthly kilowat-hours sold per residential consumer
during 1957 was 283, the average monthly bill was $7.85, and the
average revenue per kilowat-hour was 2.77 cents. For commercial and
industrial users, including schools, churches, etc., the average monthly
usage during 1957 was 1,089 KWH, the average monthly bill was
$21.22, and the average revenue per KWH was 1.95 cents. The average
monthly energy use by residential consumers has more than doubled
since 1949 while the average revenue per KWH has decreased by over
one fourth during the same period.
EXHIBIT "C"
SOUTH CENTRAL UTAH TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, INC.
STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS
AS OF
SEPTENBER 30, 1958
Year to
Mouth of
Date
Revenues
September
$ 4,552.45
Local Service Revenue-Orderville Exchange....$ 546.30
3,249.04
Beryl Exchange ----·-···· 380.64
"
"
"
3,066.02
Kooshnrem Exchange.. 338.63
"
"
"
2,360.99
"
"
"
Escalante Exchange.... 197.67
1,528.37
Tropic Exchange ________ 157.05
"
"
"
1,036.96
Boulder Exchange ...... 127.50
"
"
"
Total ·-·-·················-·-···-------······--············------------$1,747. 79

$15,793.83
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421.36
286.25
437.32
194.50
191.64
62.80

2,922.15
2,834.47
2,773.85
1,456.92
1,448.40
373.31

Total --·--··----···-------·-----···---·-·------------------------------$1,593.87
Miscellaneous Operating Revenue ________________________ $ 151.54

$11,809.10
$ 2,190.03

Total Operating Revenues ---·-------------·-·--·-----$3,493.20

$29,792.96

Toll Service Revenue-Beryl Exchange ............
Escalante Exchange....
"
"
"
Orderville Exchange ....
"
"
Tropic Exchange ........
"
"
"
Koosharem Exchange ..
"
"
Boulder Exchange ......
"
"
"

EXPENSES
Depreciation ----------------------------------------------------------·---$1,174.93
Maintenance Labor -------------------------------------------------- 556.73
Interest to REA ----------------·--·---------------------------------- 535.67
Office Salaries ·-----------·-------·-----·------------------------------- 414.48
Maintenance Deduction.:; from Income ---------------- 138.79
Maintenance Truck Expense ----------------------------·--· 165.57
Power ····------·------------------------------------------------··-----··------ 127.52
Other General Expenses ····------------------------------------ 187.29
Legal ····-------------·-------------------------------------------·------------0Insurance ·---------------------------····------------·--------------------·
61.45
Taxes - State, County and LocaL......................
83.38
Other Maintenance Expenses -------------------------------15.51
Maintenance Materials & Supplies ---------------------·
47.41
Travel --------------------------------------------·---·--·-·-----------------77.46
Supply Expense Clearing ---------·····-·-··-----------·--·----0Taxes - Federal -----·-·-------------------------------------------89.08
Office Supplies & Expense ---------------------·-------------8.68
Postage & Envelopes --------------------·-----------------------0Rent ---------------------------------------------------------------------------20.00
Relief & Pensions -----------·----·--·-------------------------------(6.44)
Other Traffic Expenses --------------------------------------·--·
19.65
Directors Fees -----------------------·-···--------------·------------·
-0Stationery & Printing ·----------------·-·-·-···------------------0-

$10,579.53
4,649.69
4,531.15
3,578.84
1,249.11
1,101.40
1,037.17
819.00
480.00
472.73
462.12
333.65
321.68
289.92
268.70
253.99
237.93
220.26
180.00
177.53
152.90
135.00
79.58

Total Operating Expenses ------------------------·---$3,717.16

$31,612.36

Net Loss for the Period ................................ $ 223.96

$ 1,819.40

SOUTH CENTRAL UTAH TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, INC.
STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS
AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1959
Month of
Year to
Revenue
February
Date
Local Service Revenue-Orderville Exchange .... $ 557.71
$ 1,164.99
793.62
"
"
"
Beryl Exchange ------···· 381.80
"
"
"
Kosharem Exchange.... 340.55
683.34
"
;;
,
Escalante Exchange.... 318.23
609.86
420.01
Tropic Exchange ·------- 204.72
Boulder Exchange ______ 127.50
258.90
"
"
"
$1,930.51

Toll Service Revenue-OrdervPle Exchange .... $ 264.07
"
"
"
Beryl Exchange .......... 252.73

$ 3,930.72
$ 659.29
652.54
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,

"
"
"

Escalante Excl1ange....
Tropic Exchange
Koosharem Ex~hange..
Boulder Exchange -M--

172.75
111.84
113.35
27.13

437.65
258.87
228.71
107.64

$ 941.87
Miscellaneous Operating Revenues --------------------$ 248.05
Total Revenues ------------------------------------------------$3,120.88

$ 2,344.70
$ 295.80
$ 6,571.22

Interest ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 479.10
Maintenance Labor -------------------------------------------------- 461.93
Taxes - State, County and Local ------------------------ 300.00
Relief & Pensions ---------------------------------------------------- (12.88)
Other Miscellaneous Deductions from Income ___ _ 139.13
Outside Services- Engineering, Auditing, etc. ___ _ 72.00
Other Traffic Expense -------------------------------------------- 155.17
57.88
Insurance Expense -----------------------···-----------------------28.50
Meals, Traveling & Incidental Expense -------------25.21
Telephone Service ---------------------------------------------------34.30
Office Supplies & Expense -----------------------------------50.20
Vehicle Clearing Account -------------------------------------43.44
Maintenance Materials & Supplies ---------------------20.00
Rent---------------------------------------------------------------------------42.30
Membership Fees in Trade Associations ------------oDirectors Fees ---------------------------------------------------------1.87
Station Removals & Changes -------------------------------14.85
Stationery & Printing ---------~----------------------------------

$ 2,510.85
1,072.87
1,047.06
709.74
600.00
283.36
278.26
213.55
162.42
115.76
109.55
67.01
57.13
55.62
47.59
44.35
42.30
36.00
32.02
14.85

Total Expenses ------------------------------------------------$3,560.64
Net Loss for the Period ------------·--·--··--··----------------$ 439.76

$ 7,500.29
$ 929.07

,

,

"

,

77

77

Sutherland Statutory Construction 3rd Ed. Vol 2Sec. 2102 to 2115 :
"At common law the only statutes of which
the Courts would take notice were public acts, and these
were called general laws. Obviously, the constitutional
provisions concerning general laws and law·s of a general
nature used the tern1 in a different and n1ore limited
sense. Although some courts followed the common law
definition this was erroneous because a public act can be
special or local as well as general. If the subject of the
statute 1nay apply to and affect the people of every politi-
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cal subdivision of the State, it is a law of general nature
and must have uniform operation... A general law may
operate only in a particular ·County, and only affect a
small group of persons at the time of its enactment if
the classification of the group is reasonable and if the
statute will apply equally to all in a similar situation
coming within its scope a law is general not because it
operates on every person in the State, but because every
person brought within the relations and circumstances
provided for by the act is affected. See Martin v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 194 Cal. 93, 227 P. 762
(1924): In re Livingstone, 76 P. 2nd.1192 (1938)
The court in Martin v. Superior Court of Sacramento
County 227 P. P. 763-was confronted with the question
of the constitutionality of a statute passed in 1923 which
provided "In counties and cities and counties having a
population of 100,000 inhabitants or over, such selection
(of trial jurors) shall be made by a majority of the
judges of the superior courts." By this enactment the
basis of classification for the purpose of selecting jurors
was changed. The court in this cause said : "It is conceded, as indeed it must be, that where a classification of
persons of things is distinctive and such distinction is
based upon some constitutional or natural, or intrinsic
distinction, laws may be applicable to such class alone,
providing the act is uniform as to all persons or th2ngs
within such class.-The amendment under consideration
is not, in our opinion, a special law. It is a general law
having a uniform operation upon a class of persons or
things readily naturally differentiated from another class
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of persons or things by reason of the necessities peculiar
to the subject rnatter of the legislation. A law is not special legislation merely because it does not apply to all persons. It is a settled principle of constitutional law that
the legislature may classify for the purpose of meeting
different conditions, naturally requiring different legislation, in order that legislation may be adapted to the needs
of the people. If the law is to bear equally upon all persons, the legislature must classify whenever there exists a
reason which may rationally be held to justify a diversity
of legislation. In other words, different persons, different
localities, and different· governmental organizations and
agencies may justly be found by the legislature to stand
in different relations to the law, and if the same law were,
in such a situation, to be applied to all alike, it would not
bear equally upon each of them. Darcy v. Mayor, etc. of
the City of San Jose, 104 Cal. 462, 38 P. 500; In re Sumida, 177 Ca1388, 170 P. 823.
The classification, however, must not be arbitrarily
made for the mere purpose of classification, but must
be based upon some distinction, natural, intrinsic, or constitutional, which suggests a reason for and justifies the
particular legislation. That is to say, not only must the
class itself be germane to the purpose of the law, but
the individual components of the class must he characterized by sOine substantial qualities or attributes which
suggest the need for and the propriety of the legislation.
Subject to these limitations a law is general despite the
fact that it operates on]~, upon a class of individuals or
things, if it applie~ equally to all persons or things within
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the class to which it is addressed. (Pasadina v. Stimson
91·Cal. 238, 27 P. 604; McDonald v. Conniff, 99 Cal. 386,
34 P. 71; Title, etc., Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Gal.
289,88 P. 356, 8 L.R.A. 682.
1The power to thus classify necessarily carries with
it a wide descretion in the exercise thereof. The authority
and the duty to ascertain the facts which will justify
classified legislation must of necessity rest with the legislature, in the first instance, to whom has been given the
power to legislate and not to the Courts, and the decision
of the legislature in that behalf is ordinarily conclusive
upon the Courts. Every presumption is in favor of validity of the legislative act, and the legislative classification
will not therefore be disturbed unless it is palpably arbitrary in its nature and neither founded upon nor supported by reason. (In the matter of a proceeding to
validate the Sutter-Butte by-Pass assessment No. 6 of the
Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District (Cal.
Sup.) 218 P. 27. It follows that in any given case if the
existence of a state of facts of which the court may take
judicial notice seems to have been made the basis of a
particular piece of legislation, and if it may be reasonably said that such facts afford good ground for the
making of a particular classification; the legislative enactment will be upheld, although the reason therefor does
not appear prima facie in the law itself. Stevenson v.
Colgan 91 Cal. 649, 27 P. 1089·; Grumhach v. Lelande,
154 Cal. 679, 98 P. 1059; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311,
27 Sup ct. 289, 51 L'. Ed. 499.
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In determining the need and propriety of classified
legislation, where the same does not appear on the face
of the legislative enactment, the Court may resort to its
judicial knowledge of the contemporaneous conditions
and situation of the people, the existing economic, sociologic and civic policy of the State, and all other matters
of common knowledge - In other words, "where the discretion so to classify is vested in the legislature, the
selection of a limit is a legislative power which will be
judicially reviewd only in a plain case of abuse."
In Bacon v. Walker reported in 204 U. S. P. 311,
the factual situation involved a law of Idaho which provided a civil damage of $100 for sheep trespassing within
2 miles of a dwelling house. The action was brought in
the Justice's Court, appealed to the District Court and
finally affirmed by the Supreme Court of Idaho. In
error to the Supreme Court of Idaho the case was heard
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Idaho Act provided: "Sec. 1210. It is not lawful
for any person owning or having charge of sheep to herd
the same, or permit them to be herded, on the land or
possessory claims of other persons, or to herd the same
or permit them to graze within 2 miles of the dwelling
house of the owner or owners of said possessory claim."
The act then provides the penalty for damages. The
plaintiff in error alleges, among other things that the
Idaho law makes a discrimination that is arbitrary. The
·u. S. Supreme Court held: "The laws and policy of a
State may be framed and shaped to suit its conditions
of climate and soil-The sele~ction of some limt is a legis-
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lative power, and it is only against the .abuse of that
power if ,at all, that the courts may interpose. But the
abuse must be shown. It is nO't shown by quoting the provision which expresses the lim~t. The mere distance (2
miles) expressed shows nothing. The Court concludes
that such a statute is a vindication from the accusation of
being an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination
against the sheep industry. The statute was sustained as
a constitutional exercise of the power of the state on account of the peculiar nature of the right and the objects
upon which it was exerted, for the purpose of protecting
all of the collective owners.
Returning to Sutherland Statutory Construction the
author says: "The form of enactment is not conclusive.
The courts will consider the entire act along with the
surrounding circumstances, the reasons for passage, and
the purposes to be accomplished. An act general in form
but special in fact will be treated judicially, as a special
act, but this does not mean that the act is unconstitutional
-The uniformity that is required is to prevent the granting to any person, or class of persons, the privileges or
immunities which upon the same terms do not belong to
all persons - When an act is assailed as class or special
legislation, the attack is usually based on the claim that
there are persons or things similarly situated to those
embraced in the act, and which by the terms of the act are
excluded from its operation. The question then is whether
the persons or things embraced by the act form by themselves a proper and legitimate class with reference to the
purposes of the act. Constitutions do not forbid a reason-
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able and proper classification of the objects of legislation.
The question is, what is reasonable and proper - Most
litigation concerns the reasonableness of the limits imposed on the operation of the contested act - The
standards used by the Courts have been stated in many
different ways. Some Courts have held a general act
applies alike to all of a certain class and operates uniformly on all persons in a similar category; that is to
say, when a class is determined by the legislature, in order
to sustain the act, all in the class must receive uniform
treatment. The author, at this point, cites the case of
Clear Lake Coop Livestock Shippers Ass'n v. Weir, reported in 206 N. W. at page 279, the facts being these:
The 39th general assembly of the State of Iowa, authorized by law the creation of agricultural marketing
agencies for the sole purpose of marketing farm products. Each association created thereunder, adopted b~'
laws, which required the membership to sell all its livestock through this agency. The appellant, being a n1ember
of the appellee, was charged with selling certain of his
livestock outside this marketing agency. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Iowa it was contended that the act
violated Section 6 of Article I, of the Constitution whicli
reads: "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation; the general assen1bly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of ritizens, privileges or imn1unities,
which, upon the sa1ne terms shall not equally belong to
all citizens." It was contended that the power conferred
upon associations organized under this chapter is withheld from individual or voluntary, co-operative, unincor-
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, , porated associations engaged in the same line of industry, .
and therefore its provisions are discriminatory and arbitrary and not based upon an obvious or natural classification or industry. In answer to this contention the
Supreme Court said: "The contention overlooks the purpose of the act. Its design was to secure unity and
cooperation among all producers of livestock in order
that greater efficiency might be secured in selling livestock on foreign markets - The right of the legislature
to enact legislation for the incorporation of non-profit
sharing, cooperative associations is not questioned. Perhaps the legislature taking cognizance of altered conditions in farming and other industries, believed a change
of public policy should be adopted." The author of this
text continues: "Others say if the basis of classification
is valid it is wholly immaterial how many or how few
there are in the class." The author continues "authorities
are divided on the propriety of judicial review of legislative classifications. Most authorities agree, however,
that it is not necessary that every city or county be included, but none can be excluded in such a manner that
they can never come within the legislative classification.
Thus, classification must be prospective and not permit
the future entrance into the class when its qualification
and standards have been met. The restriction may place
either wide or narrow limits on the class, but the nearer
a classification comes to total generality the more susceptible it is to attack. A valid classification must include
all who "naturally" belong to the class, all who posess a
common disability, attribute or classification, and there
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must be some natural and m:~bstantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched - Classifications also have been sustained on
the ground of necessity. An actual basis for differing
treatment must be established on the basis of differences
in the situation and subject matter included and excluded
from the class. Using these tests, if it is determined that
there is no reason for the classification, the rule that the
legilative determination of fact is binding will not be applied, and the act will be declared unconstitutional~ but
generally the courts will exercise every presumption in
favor of the validity of the legislative determination. In
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Justice
Cordozo said, "Time with its tides brings new condtions
which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new
conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The
constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and
always. It permits them where there are special evils with
which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The
special public purpose will sustain the special form The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative
policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the
lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be
revision by the courts. - If the evil to be corrected can
be seen to be merely fanciful, the injustice or the wrong
illusory, the courts n1ay intervene and strike the special
statute down.- If special circnn1stances have developed
of such a nature as to call for a new rule, the special act
will stand."
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In the case of Broadbent et al v. Gibson et al, 105 U.
53, this ·Court was concerned \Yith classification of property as affected by the Sunday closing law. In discussing
this question of classification this court said : "In determining whether or not this classification is unconstitutional, it must be remembered that discrimination is the
very essence of classification and is not objectionable
unless founded upon distinctions which the court is compelled to find unreasonable. (Citing State v. Mason, 94
U. 501, 78 P. 2nd 920; State v. Lormis, 75 Mont 88, 242
P. 344.) The legislature has a wide discretion in determining what shall come within the class of permitted
activities and what shall be excluded. (Citing Koman v.
St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9; 289 S.W. 838; Stewart Motor Co.
v. ·City of Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235 N.W. 332; State v.
Diamond 56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W. 831; State v. Dolan, 13
Idaho 693, 92 P. 995.)
"A court is not concerned with the wisdom or policy
of the law and cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the legistlative body. If reasonable minds differ as to the
reasonableness of the regulation, the law must be upheld." Justesen's Food Stores v. City of Tulore, 43 Cal.
App. 2nd 616, 111 P. 2nd 424,427.
In State v. Mason 94 U. 501- This court considered
the constitutionality of Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1935,
insofar as it requires a license to be obtained by persons
other than commission merchants, who for the purpose
of resale obtain from farmers possession or control of
farm products without paying cash for the same at the
time of obtaining such control or possession. The defend-
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ant was convicted of this offense and appealed urging,
among other things, that it is a denial of equal protection
clause of the constitution by creating unreasonable discriminations. The court held: "To be unconstitutional as
discriminatory, the discrimination of a statute must be
unreasonable or arbitrary and a classification is never
unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion
features so long as there is some basis for the differentation between classes or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation and if the
differentation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes
to be accomplished by the Statute.
The objects and purposes of a statute present a standard for determining propriety of classifications as respects question whether statute is unconstitutionally
discriminatory.
The Supreme Court in State v. Loomis, 75 Mont. 88,
242 P. 344 (1925) considered a Sunday closing law of the
State of Montana which provided that dance halls must
close on Sunday. The dance hall closing provision permitted theater, playhouses and other forms of entertainIuent to remain open, and further provided that this act
would not apply to dance halls and pavilions as are maintained or conducted in public parks or playgrounds where
no admission is charged. The appellant was convicted of
keeping open a dance hall on Sunday. The Supreme Court
held : "It is conceded, as it must be, that it is competent
for the lawmakers to classify subjects of legislation and
to deal differently with the different classes created, if
the classification is reasonable and not a mere artificial
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arrangement or subterfuge to avoid the inhibition of the
14th amendment to the federal constitution. Whether the
classification made by the amended .Act i's reasonable was
a matter for legislative determination in the first instance, and every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of the act; in other words,
it will be presumed that the classi'fication is reasonable,
and the defendant must assume the burden of showing
that there is not any admissable hypothesis upon which
it can be justified."
The Court in this case concluded that classification
of subjects for the purpose of legislation does not depend
upon scientific or marked differences in things or persons
or in their relations, it being sufficient to withstand the
charge of discrimination - the very essence of classification - and not objectionable unless founded on distinctions unreasonable or purely fictitious. .Am. Sugar
Ref. Co. v. Louisiana U. S. Reports 179-89.
A license tax upon those not excepted - P. alleges
tax does not impose equally such tax on all who refine
sugar and molasses. The U. S. Supreme Court held: "The
act in question does undoubtedly discriminate in favor of
a certain class of refiners, but this discrimination, if
founded upon a reasonable distinction in principle, is
valid, of course, if such discrimination were purely arbitrary, oppressive or capricious, and made to depend upon
differences of color, race, nativity, religions, opinions,
political affiliations or other considerations having no
possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would be pure favoritism, and a
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denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less
favored classes. But from time out of mind it has been
the policy of this government, not only to classify for
purposes of taxation, but to exempt producers from the
taxation of the methods employed by them to put their
production upon the market. So, too, this court has had
repeated occasion to sustain discriminations founded
upon reasons much more obscure than this. Thus in Railroad Co. v. Richmond 96 U.S. 521, a Municipal ordinance
was sustained declaring that no car or vehicle of any
kind "belonging to or used by the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. shall be drawn or propelled
by steam'' upon a certain street, although no other company was named in the ordinance, the Court held that no
other corporation had the right to run locomotives in that
street, no other corporation could be in a like situation,
and that the ordinance, while apparently limited in its
operation, was general in its effect, as it applied to all
who could do what was prohibited." "All laws should be
general in their operation, and all places within the same
city do not necessarily require the same local regulation.
While locomotives may with great propriety be excluded
from one street, it would be unreasonable to exclude them
from all." In :Missouri Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S.
205, it was said: "and when legislation applies to particular bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional
liabilities, it is not open to the objection that it denies to
them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons
brought under its influence are treated alike under the
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same conditions." To the same effect is Walston v. Nevin,

128 u.

s. 578.

In Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania 134 U. S.
:232 the Court said: ".All such regulations so long as they
proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are
within the discretion of the legislature or the people of
the State in framing their constitution."
CONCLUSION
There remains but little that can be said in summation. The plaintiff in this cause is convinced that the duty
imposed upon the taxing authority is not an easy one.
To determine "a uniform and equal rate of assessment
and taxation on all tangible proprety in the State according to its value in money," requires both wisdom and
patience.
Despite the effort in this behalf, this court which
must ultimately decide and determine these controversies,
is probably more keenly aware of the many desparities
in our taxing effort, than is any other agency or instrumentality of government. To reach a plateau of greater
equality, may require a new base upon which the tax is
levied and laid. Until then, the inequalities that spring
from this system, must be tolerated by a patient citizenry
until a rule or formula emerges with judicial sanction.
The plaintiff earnestly urges that the legislative
formula provided in Section 16-6-16 and 16-6-17 provides
a yardstick or method of determining value which secures
for assessment purposes a valuation fair and equitable
in comparison with and cmnmensurate with the valuation
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of other kinds of property. When the valuation thus secured is such that if the uniform and equal rate of taxation is applied, the property is taxed in the same proportion to its value as is all other tangible property, the
method of arriving at the assessed valuation is not subject to constitutional objections as violation of Article
13. The selection of some limit ($50 times the number of
miles of primary distribution or transmission lines $10 times the number of circuit miles) is a legislative
power, andit is only against the abuse of that power if
at all, that the courts may interpose. But the abuse must
be shown.
All such regulations so long as they proceed within
reasonable limits and general usage, are \vithin the di8cretion of the legislative or the people of the State in
framing their constitutions.
To be unconstitutional as discriminatory, the discrimination of the statute must be unreasonable or arbitrary, and a classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features, so long as
there is some basis for the differentation between classes
or subject 1natters. If reasonable 1ninds differ as to the
reasonableness of the classification, the law must be upheld.
Assaying the instant 1natter new before this C<>urt,
we very respectfully submit that Sections 16-6-16 and 166-17 do not contravene Article 13 or Article 6 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
George E. Stewart
Ferdinand Erickson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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